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LEAVING WILDLIFE OUT OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES: THE IRONY OF WYOMING V. UNITED STATES
STANLEY FIELDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wyoming v. United States,' the state of Wyoming requested permission to
vaccinate elk on the National Elk Refuge (NER), a part of the National Wildlife
Refuge System (NWRS) located within Wyoming. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
2
Service (USFWS) subsequently rejected the request. Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit
held that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the states a right to manage
3
wildlife on federal lands, "regardless of the circumstances." The court also held
that, even though the USFWS had discretion to determine whether proposed
activities on wildlife refuges were consistent with the goals of the National Wildlife
4
Refuge System Improvement Act (NWRSIA), this discretion was not unlimited.
This note will first examine the Wyoming decision in the context of the Tenth
Amendment and related state sovereignty doctrines. Second, this note will consider
the expansion of federal authority over wildlife management as it pertains to Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence and the NWRSIA. Lastly, this note will examine the
impact of the Wyoming decision on wildlife law and future cases in the Tenth
Circuit.
This note concludes that the court's ultimate interpretations and rulings in regard
to the NWRSIA provide confusion and inconsistency in the interpretation and
application of the Act. Novel and cursorily dismissed ideas for resolving conflict
over authority to manage wildlife are presented in an effort to provide alternative
strategies for reducing this confusion and inconsistency, all while increasing fidelity
to the purpose of the NWRSIA and the National Wildlife Refuge System. These
ideas are presented for consideration as possible alternatives to the Wyoming court's
resolution of the issues examined.
U. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brucellosis is caused by the bacteria Brucella abortus and can result in
5
spontaneous abortion, arthritis, lameness, and/or sterility in hoofed animals. This
6 There is also
disease has been documented to occur in cattle and elk in Wyoming.
7
evidence that brucellosis can be spread between species. In 1985, the state of
* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. Many people were instrumental in the
completion of this note: I thank Professor Sheryl Wolf for all of her time, effort, and suggestions; Samantha Adams
and Professor Barbara Blumenfeld both supplied insightful suggestions that provided increased depth and
refinement of this note.
1. 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 1222 (Unless otherwise stated, all factual information is from Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d
1214 (10th Cir. 2002)).
3. "[T]he Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the State of Wyoming the right to manage wildlife, or more
specifically vaccinate elk, on the NER, regardless of the circumstances." Id. at 1227.
4. Id. at 1237-38.
5. Id. at 1218-19.
6. Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1993).
7. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Facts About Brucellosis, available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahpsl
brucellosis/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2003); Environment News Service, Hundreds of Yellowstone Bison Killed for
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Wyoming began a brucellosis vaccination program on state lands.8 In the early
1990s, the state reported a seventy percent calving success rate for vaccinated
animals compared with thirty percent for elk that had not been vaccinated. 9
In November of 1997, approximately twelve years after the vaccine had been put
to use, the state of Wyoming requested permission from the USFWS to vaccinate
elk for brucellosis on the NER.'0 The goal of the proposed action was to diminish
the chances of spreading the disease from elk on the NER to elk and cattle off the
refuge." Since the USFWS failed to respond to the initial request, in January of
1998 the state then proposed to undertake the vaccination program at its own cost
and to "indemnify and hold harmless" the USFWS for any claims arising from the
program.'2 The USFWS did eventually respond by rejecting the state's request,
claiming there was not enough information to find the vaccine "safe and effective."' 3
At the same time, the USFWS failed to supply evidence contradicting the state's
claims concerning the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. 4 Furthermore, the USFWS
failed to propose any alternative plans to stem the spread of the disease. 5 Wyoming
then filed suit in federal district court under the Tenth Amendment and the
NWRSIA claiming that the USFWS had interfered with the state's right to manage
wildlife within the state.16 Wyoming subsequently added a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for review of the agency's decision to reject the state's
request.' 7 The district court granted the motion of the United States to dismiss on all
counts, and Wyoming subsequently filed an appeal. 8
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. ' The court held that the
Tenth Amendment does not reserve the right to manage wildlife to the states,
"regardless of the circumstances,"2 and that the NWRSIA granted the USFWS
authority to determine whether vaccination of elk on the NER conflicted with the
goals of the NWRSIA. 2' Nonetheless, in regard to the state's APA claim, the Tenth

Roaming, availableat http://ens-news.com/ens/mar2003/2003-03-06-10.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) ("[E]lk can
carry brucellosis and there are documented cases of transmission from elk to cattle."); Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1220
("transmit[tal] [of] brucellosis from elk to cattle in confined conditions").
8. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1220.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1221.
11.

Id.

12. Id.
13. Id.
at 1221-22.
14. Id. at 1240.
15. Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999) ("Only the poor, dumb
creatures of the wild suffer as this disease spreads while the FWS dithers over whether Wyoming's vaccination
program has imperfections. That Wyoming's program may not be perfect is not a sine qua non, but it at least is
moving forward to do something about a serious, spreading wildlife disease. The Court is sorry that this patchwork
of federal law gives the Secretary room to play out his stalling game while doing nothing.") (emphasis added), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002); Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1241 ("[W]e are faced with a
situation where the program, or lack thereof, by one sovereign allegedly impairs the meaningful accomplishment
of another sovereign's responsibilities.") (emphasis added).
16. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1222-23.
17. Id. at 1222.
18. Id. at 1223-24.
19. Id. at 1241.
20. Id. at 1227.
21. Id. at 1235.
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Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the USFWS had unlimited discretion
to determine whether proposed activities were contrary to the NWRSIA.2 2
mL BACKGROUND
The complexity of this case arises from the intersection of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence and the concept of federal preemption. The basis of state wildlife
management authority has been couched in terms of sovereign authority and
authority reserved under the Tenth Amendment. 23 The issue of federal preemption
primarily depends upon whether the language of the NWRSIA clearly and explicitly
states Congress's intent to preempt applicable state law. 24 Further complicating the
issue as to how the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty claims should be
addressed, the Tenth Amendment's power has waxed and waned throughout history
and the judiciary has struggled to define and apply the Tenth Amendment consistently.
In this case, the Tenth Circuit was asked to examine three challenges to the
authority claimed by the USFWS under the NWRSIA: first, whether state authority
to manage terrestrial wildlife on federal lands within the state's borders was a right
retained under the Tenth Amendment;26 second, whether the Congressional grant of
authority to the agency under the NWRSIA preempted state authority regarding
wildlife management on federal wildlife refuges;27 and finally, whether the
NWRSIA allowed judicial review of the agency's decision under the APA. 28 Review
of state authority to manage wildlife has often been viewed in the context of the
Tenth Amendment and related sovereign authority. 29 Thus, it is appropriate to undertake a thorough analysis of the basis for state wildlife management in the context of
the Tenth Amendment and related jurisprudence.
A. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ' 30 This amendment reserves authority
to the states and to the people if authority has not been expressly reserved to the
federal government or precluded from the states or people by the Constitution.3" At

22. Id. at 1237-39.
23. See generally Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920);
Abby Dodge v. United States, 223 U.S. 166 (1912); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruledby Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); N.M. State Game Comm'n v. Udall,
410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969).
24. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
25. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13 (3d ed. 2000) ("Vacillating attitudes
regarding federalism and the importance of state sovereignty.....
26. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1222-24.
27. Id. at 1222-23.
28. Id. at 1223-24.
29. See generally Hunt, 278 U.S. 96; Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166; Geer, 161 U.S.
519, overruled by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391; N.M. State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1197.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-12 ("[The Tenth Amendment] serves as an instruction on how to read the
Constitution's silences with respect to national governmental authority. On that subject, the Tenth Amendment
indicates, constitutionalsilence constitutes negation.").

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

the same time, the Property Clause 32 empowers the federal government to exercise
control over federal property within a state,33 and state authority does not extend to
federal lands when state law is contrary to federal law or policy. 34 The Property
Clause grants Congress "the power to make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."35
However, state authority is not preempted unless Congress has enacted legislation
that overrides conflicting state law36 by one of the delineated methods of preemption.37
In Wyoming, the Tenth Amendment claim and Property Clause 38 and preemption
issues are highly interrelated. The Tenth Amendment claim can be affected by how
broadly the Property Clause is interpreted or by whether there is preemption by the
NWRSIA itself. For example, if the Property Clause is interpreted to grant Congress
unlimited authority and discretion to manage federal lands (and the wildlife on those
lands), then preemption under the NWRSIA is unnecessary because the Tenth
Amendment is inapplicable.39 On the other hand, if the Property Clause is not
interpreted to include such broad and implicit authority, then the NWRSIA must
expressly preempt state law in the wildlife management context.40
The Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty did not fare particularly well during
the period between the early twentieth century and 1976."' During that span, the
focus was largely on the ability of Congress to impose minimum wage and overtime
pay standards on states.42 In the wildlife law context, the Supreme Court held that
the Tenth Amendment must give way to the treaty power expressly granted to
Congress in the Constitution 43 as well as the authority in both the Commerce" and

32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.").
33. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976).
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
36. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04.
37. There are generally three ways that federal law can preempt state law. Pac.Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S.
at 203-04. First, Congress can use "explicit preemptive language." d. at 203. Second, a
"scheme of federal regulation [may be] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room to supplement it," because "the Act of Congress may touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by
the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose."
Id. at 204 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). Finally, federal
preemption of state law occurs when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1962)), or where
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
39. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), supercededby Franklin
v. City of Kettering, 246 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. of Dist. of Colo. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
40. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04; supra note 37.
41. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-11.
42. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. 528.
43. See State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("To answer this question it is not enough
to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article 2,
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Property Clauses.45 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently relied upon
the Tenth Amendment and related principles of sovereignty to substantiate state
authority to regulate wildlife in their state, and that this authority existed prior to the
United States.4 6 More importantly, failing to recognize both the substantive authority
of the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty is inconsistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions on the subject. For example, in UnitedStates v. Lopez47 and United
States v. Morrison,5 the Supreme Court recognized that the Tenth Amendment and
principles of federalism require earnest analysis to ensure that Congress does not
exceed its limitations and intrude upon authority retained by states.49
B. The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (NWRSIA)
The NWRSIA was enacted in 1997, and its purpose is "to administer a national
network of lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the
United States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans." 50 The
Act further states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the
authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or
regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within
the System."'"
In Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit found these two sentences incongruent and held
that the clause purporting to allow states to retain authority over wildlife on national
wildlife refuges in the NWRSIA could not be interpreted as such because it would
destroy the goal "to administer a national network of lands."5 Since the Wyoming
court interpreted the phrase "to administer a national network of lands" as the
primary goal of the Act, the court concluded that the clause reserving authority to
the states should not be construed as it is written because to do so would undermine
the purpose of the Act.53

Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6 treaties made under the authority of
the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared
the supreme law of the land.").
44. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).
45. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543; Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. at 175-76; Geer, 161 U.S. at 534, overruled
by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265-66 (1891); McCready, 94 U.S. at 394.
47. 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy and O'Connor, J.J., concurring) ("While the intrusion on state
sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, the intrusion
is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger connection or identification with commercial concerns that are central
to the Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that this Court
is obliged to enforce."); id. at 592 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Even before the passage of the Tenth Amendment,
it was apparent that Congress would possess only those powers 'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution.").
48. 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers
enumerated in the Constitution.").
49. It is appropriate to note the breadth of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, the criminal law nature of the
legislation under review in Lopez and Morrison, and that state dominance in the area of wildlife management is
comparable to criminal law. Therefore, analysis of state authority over wildlife management in the context of the
Property Clause should be similar.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
52. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
53. Id. at 1234-35.
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C. The Administrative ProcedureAct (APA)
Under the APA, an agency's decision can be overturned if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."54
Although deference to agency decisions is the standard,55 there must be evidence
that the agency considered the relevant information available to it at the time it made
a decision.56
In Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit primarily relied upon the NWRSIA's requirement
that the USFWS comply with state policies and objectives to the "extent practicable ' 57 and the Act's legislative history to conclude that judicial review was appropriate.58 After reviewing the agency's decision, the court found that the burden
rested upon the USFWS to demonstrate that it had considered all relevant information available for review and based its decision on the information it had.5 9 Since the
state claimed that there was reliable evidence supporting the efficacy of the
vaccination program, and that the USFWS did not address this evidence, Wyoming
had met the minimum burden requiring review of the APA claim.6 °
To summarize, Wyoming's claims presented the court with the opportunity to
analyze state authority to manage wildlife on national wildlife refuges under the
Tenth Amendment, Congressional intent to preempt state law under the NWRSIA,
and the authority of the judiciary to review agency decisions under the NWRSIA
and the APA. Analysis of these issues diverges because of their distinct historical
contexts and development. The question regarding management of wildlife under
the Tenth Amendment brings with it hundreds of years of judicial precedent, history,
and tradition.6 The remaining two questions both rely on the NWRSIA itself. There
has not been as much precedent addressing the NWRSIA issues presented to the
court in Wyoming because the Act was enacted in 1997, which is relatively recent.
IV. RATIONALE
The rationale used by the Wyoming court to decide these three primary issues is
presented for a more complete understanding of the case. If the court's rationale was
not expressly stated, its implicit rationale is presented. The rationale used to decide
the Tenth Amendment challenge is presented at the outset, then the preemption
challenge, and, finally, the APA challenge under the NWRSIA.
A. The Tenth Amendment and the Property Clause
Wyoming acknowledged that the Property Clause does not act as an automatic
withdrawal of all federal land from state jurisdiction.6 2 The court stated that "[t]he

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Id. at 843.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
Id. at 1238 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
See supra note 46.
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1226.
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Property Clause simply empowers Congress to exercise jurisdiction over federal
land within a State if Congress so chooses."63 The court also acknowledged the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 64 where it stated, "the 'complete power' that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to
regulate and protect the wildlife living there."65 The Tenth Circuit then concluded
that "the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the state of Wyoming the right to
manage wildlife, or more specifically to vaccinate elk, on the NER, regardless of the
circumstances. 66
The court did recognize, however, that "states have possessed 'broad trustee and
police powers over the.. .wildlife within their borders, including.. .wildlife found on
Federal lands within a State.' ,67 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the authority
exercised by states when managing wildlife on federal lands was not "constitutionally-based"; 68 therefore, it was not a constitutionally protected authority. 69 The
Wyoming court did not expand its explanation of the rule but ultimately concluded
that the Property Clause implicitly delegates to the United States the power to
exclusively regulate and manage wildlife on federal lands.7 1 This power is primarily
based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Kleppe that "the Property Clause also
gives Congress
the power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwith' 71
standing.
B. Preemption under the NWRSIA
The authority of the USFWS under the NWRSIA to exclude state management,
"regardless of the circumstances," depends upon the construction of the NWRSIA
itself.7 2 The court analyzed the text to determine whether the Act grants authority to
the USFWS to essentially preempt all state management of wildlife on national
wildlife refuges within the state of Wyoming. Specifically, the NWRSIA must
demonstrate that there was a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to supercede
state law when enacting the legislation.73
In reaching its conclusion that the NWRSIA preempts state authority to manage
wildlife on federal lands, the court relied upon a clause in the NWRSIA stating that
the "mission" of the NWRSIA is "to administer a national network of lands. 74 The
court interpreted this portion of the Act as its primary purpose, 75 and that this
purpose could only be met if the NWRSIA were interpreted to "supercede" state

63.
64.
65.
removing,
16 U.S.C.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1227.
426 U.S. 529 (1976).
Id. at 540-41 (analyzing whether the federal government could preclude the state from capturing,
and selling protected animals from federal lands under the federal Wild Horses and Burros Act of 1971,
§ 1331).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.
Id. at 1226 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 24.3).
Id.
Id. at 1227.

70. Id.
71. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546.
72. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.

73. Id. at 1231 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
74. Id. at 1234.
75. Id.
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law.76 Consequently, the court found that, in order for a federal agency to manage
wildlife on the NER according to the NWRSIA, it must be able to exclude state
management authority "regardless of the circumstances.""
C. Review of the USFWS Decision under the APA
The court recognized that agency actions are subject to judicial review7 8 unless
"statutes preclude judicial review, or agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law."79 The court maintained that "U]udicial review of final agency
action by an aggrieved person will not cut off unless there is persuasive reason to
believe that such was the purpose of Congress."80
Upon reviewing the text of the NWRSIA, the court found insufficient evidence
to support a finding that Congress sought to preclude judicial review of agency
decisions under the Act.8 ' This finding was based upon NWRSIA language that
states, "the Secretary shall ensure effective coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of land adjoining refuges and the fish and wildlife agency of the
States in which the units of the System are located."82 Since the court perceived this
language to operate as a limitation on the Secretary,83 the court ultimately concluded
that there was not a grant of unlimited discretion prohibiting judicial review. 84
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Key issues raised in Wyoming will be analyzed separately: first, the Tenth
Amendment analysis and state authority to manage wildlife; 85 second, issues regarding preemption; 86 and third, review under the APA. 87 Each analysis will discuss legal
and applied background, the court's decision, and possible implications.
A. The Tenth Amendment and State Authority to Manage Wildlife
The Tenth Amendment's substantive power has oscillated throughout history and
currently appears to be ascending. 8 For this reason, it is necessary that Wyoming's
Tenth Amendment claim be thoroughly analyzed. Thorough analysis will offer
insight and guidance for the review of similar claims in the future and will afford
proper legal analysis of state sovereignty claims under the Tenth Amendment.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 1234-35.
Id. at 1236.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)).
Id. (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
Id.
Nat'l Wildlife Sys. Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(e) (2003).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1236.
Id.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See supranotes 24, 47-49.
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With the recent waxing of state sovereignty,8 9 Wyoming appears to have provided
an excessively cursory examination of the state's Tenth Amendment claim. As the
Supreme Court of the United States has stated,
The powers delegated by the...Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which.. .remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite... .The powers reserved to the several States.. .extend to all objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the State. 9°
Even though one may challenge the effectiveness of the dual system of
sovereignty in restraining infringements by the U.S. government on state sovereignty, there is no question regarding the federal design to do so. 9' The Supreme
Court has repeatedly adhered to the axiom that states possess concurrent sovereignty
that is conditioned only upon the Supremacy Clause itself.92 If the Constitution does
not speak directly upon an issue, then the U.S. government still might preclude state
authority in a certain field under the Supremacy Clause.93 In situations where the
Constitution does not specifically address an issue, the question ultimately becomes
one of preemption. In other words, since the Constitution clearly does not expressly
wrest wildlife management from the states, it must be determined whether the
federal government enacted laws that do so.
The purpose of the Tenth Amendment is to protect the states and people from
unconstitutional intrusions by the federal government.' To accomplish this goal,
explicit preemptive language is generally required to demonstrate Congress's clear
intent to preempt state law in an area the states have traditionally controlled.95
Management of wildlife has been found by the Supreme Court to "remain under
the exclusive control of the State."96 The primary exceptions include enforcement
of international treaties where the federal government has agreed with a foreign
nation on the management of species transitorily within individual states,97 when
wildlife is in the stream of commerce,98 when Congress explicitly preempts state
management on federal lands under the Supremacy Clause, 99 where wildlife
damages the property of the United States, l" ° or where the federal government is

89. Id.
90. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 292-93 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
91. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
92. Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,458 (1990)); Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
93. See, e.g., supranote 37.
94. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-12.
95. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac.Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; TRIBE, supra
note 25, § 6-3 1.
96. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395.
97. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
98. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 339 ("[W]hen a wild animal 'becomes an article of commerce...its use cannot be
limited to the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens of another State."' (quoting Geer, 161 U.S. at 538)).
99. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 ("[W]hen Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides
conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.").
100. Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
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attempting to determine what animals "may be detrimental to the use of [a national]
park." 01
There is a fundamental expectation that a regulation intended to preempt state law
will clearly state this intention.' °2 As the Supreme Court explained in California
CoastalCommission v. GraniteRock Company,0 3 this expectation exists
because agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak
through a variety of means....we can expect that they will make their intentions
clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive.... [I]f an agency does not
speak to the question of preemption, we will pause before saying that the mere
volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact
intend to preempt.° 4
Upon examining agency regulations promulgated under the Mining Act of
1872,105 the Supreme Court went on to state that "[iut is impossible to divine from...
regulations, which expressly contemplate coincident compliance with state law as
well as federal law, an intention to preempt all state regulation... '1°6In Wyoming,
the problem is identical. The legislation at issue also "expressly contemplates
requirement upon which
coincident compliance with state law." In fact, this is 0the
7
the Tenth Circuit bases its finding for judicial review.1
Even so, in order to truly assess the merits of the Tenth Amendment and state
sovereignty claim, it is important to separate the Tenth Amendment issues from
those issues surrounding preemption. The question of whether there is Tenth
Amendment and state sovereign authority tends to become entangled with discussion of preemption. 0 8 Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty analysis consists of
determining whether the U.S. Constitution preserved state authority to manage
wildlife.
The Property Clause was cited by the Wyoming court as constitutionally granting
the United States the authority to exclusively manage wildlife on federal lands
within sovereign states."° This interpretation of the Property Clause has four
primary difficulties. First, it fails to differentiate "the Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States""0 from the presence of wild animals on such property. A
familiar concept in wildlife law is that wild animals are not regarded as property and
regulation of them can only occur through sovereign authority over the land on

101. N.M. State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d at 1201.
102. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; TRIBE, supra
note 25, § 6-31.
103. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).

104. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (quoting Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)).
105. Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2003).

106. Cal. CoastalComm'n, 480 U.S. at 584.
107. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.

108. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-2 (providing a discussion of preemption and "reverse preemption"
of state laws in the context of the Commerce Clause).
109. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.

2 (emphasis added).
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.

Winter 2004]

NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES

which the animal is found at a particular time."I' Therefore, there is a need for substantive analysis of states' rights when state authority is allegedly preempted. The
need for substantive analysis is especially apparent in situations where the legal
province targeted by a claim of preemption has long been dominated by the states.
The second difficulty arises when there is concurrent sovereignty over a particular
property, which is often the case with federal lands."12 It is common knowledge that

the management of wildlife on federal lands is primarily undertaken by the state in
which the federal property is located. 113 This is not to say that the federal government could not and does not preempt state law as it pertains to federal property, but,
in circumstances such as those in Wyoming, it must do so clearly and explicitly."'
In Wyoming, Tenth Amendment analysis concerns whether the state has a constitutional claim under the Tenth Amendment and related principles, not whether the
NWRSIA "clearly and manifestly" states an intention to preempt state wildlife
management on the NER." 5 In other words, the issue raised under the Tenth
Amendment claim should be isolated from the issue concerning preemption under
the NWRSIA. This will help to ensure proper analysis of the Tenth Amendment
claim. Therefore, focus should be on the source of the state's authority to manage
wildlife (i.e., from where the state's authority to manage wildlife ultimately
emanates).
A third difficulty with the reasoning in Wyoming is that it equates Property
Clause authority with management of wildlife on federal lands. Wyoming appears
to have largely, and erroneously, relied upon Supreme Court dicta that stated, "the
power over public land ...entrusted to Congress is without limitations. ' .116 If that were
so, the authors of the Property Clause could have easily stated such without using
additional qualifiers that denote limitations on the grant of this authority. 1 7
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's recognition of such impractical dicta as law all but
ignores the Supreme Court's holding in Kleppe that "[a]bsent consent or cession a

11. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434; Geer, 161 U.S. at 529, overruled by Hughes, 441 U.S. at 339; Criminal
Jurisdiction of Utah over Non-Indians Hunting on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Violation of State Law,
Dept. of the Interior Solicitor's Op. 78 101, 102 (1971).
112. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-8 at 848-50 (discussing the intricacies of dual sovereignty over
federal lands).
113. See, e.g., Wyoming Game and Fish Dep't, 2002 Deer Hunting Season, available at http://gf.state.wy.us/
admin/regulations/chapter6/ch6deer.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) (defining hunting seasons and bag limits for
federal and non-federal lands); N.M. Dep't of Game and Fish, 2003-2004 Hunting Proclamation, available at
http://www.gmfsh.state.nm.us/PageMillImages/Huntinglbiggamerib03-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2003) (defining
hunting seasons, bag limits, and fire arm and ammunition restrictions for federal and non-federal lands). From
personal observation, it is indeed a rare occasion when a federal employee is seen on federal lands (e.g., National
Forest lands, Bureau of Land Management lands, etc.) during hunting season. On the other hand, it is quite common
to observe many state game officials monitoring hunters and establishing roadblocks to determine harvest numbers
and to ensure all hunters are properly licensed, attired, not intoxicated, etc. The hunting proclamations issued by
states include federal lands. State management on these lands is logical because of the practicality and increased
ease of regulatory application.
114. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; TRIBE,
supra note 25, § 6-3 1.
115. See generally supra note 37.
116. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529).
117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2., which states, "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States...."
(emphasis added).
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State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but
Congress.. .retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to
the Property Clause."" 8 The Wyoming court has failed to recognize any jurisdiction
by the state of Wyoming over wildlife on federal lands and is, therefore, squarely
at odds with Supreme Court precedent. " 9
Finally, the Tenth Circuit relies heavily upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Kleppe that "the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife
on public lands, state law notwithstanding."' 2 ° Difficulties here stem from the fact
that the Supreme Court also recognized state authority to manage wildlife on federal
lands absent preemption, 2 ' something Wyoming did not do. Furthermore, Kleppe
interpreted the Property Clause to grant a "power to protect wildlife on public
lands,"' 122 not the authority to neglect wildlife and exclude a state from protecting
wildlife on and off public lands. Indeed, the management of wildlife on the NER24has
been found "negligent,"'123 as even the Tenth Circuit recognized in Wyoming.1
v. State of Virginia,125 the regulation
As the Supreme Court set out in McCready
26
states.
the
of
province
of wildlife is the
In view of the clear distinction between state and national power on the subject,
long settled... [the provisions of legislation aimed at regulating wildlife] must be
construed as alone applicable to the subject within the authority of Congress to
regulate,27and, therefore, be held not to embrace that which was not within such
power. 1

Given that wildlife management has long been the province of the states and is
largely undertaken by states even on federal lands, 28 the authority to manage
terrestrial game animals on federal lands presented a quandary entitled to more
examination than given by the court in Wyoming. 29 While there are many new and
aggressive pieces of legislation that delve into this state-dominated area, 30 the focus
of this analysis concerns the state's Tenth Amendment claim, not preemption under
the NWRSIA. With the deference and attention given to state authority by the

118. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 546.
121. Id.at 543 ("Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within
its territory, but Congress...retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property
Clause.").
122. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
123. Parker Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 477, 484 (D. Wyo. 1992).
124. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
125. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
126. Id. at 395.
127. Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. at 175.
128. See supra notes 46, 113.
129. This becomes an even larger concern when these terrestrial game animals have high rates of disease and
present threats to livestock and wild game outside of federal lands, as is the case here. Even so, this presents an
additional issue, whether the states have the authority to protect their investments and their citizens from the
negligence of federal activities on federal lands when the effects of these activities are likely to extend outside of
federal lands.
130. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); Marine Mammal Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (2000); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000); Bald Eagle Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seq. (2000).
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Supreme Court in wildlife cases,131 it appears incongruent for this court to dismiss
Wyoming's claim with hardly a discussion thereof. Even if the Tenth Circuit's
decision regarding the Tenth Amendment (as a basis for state management of wildlife on federal lands within states) is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, its
method of analysis is clearly not.
B. Preemption under the NWRSIA
The court based its preemption analysis upon the language of the NWRSIA
itself. 32 The Wyoming court's analysis and method of resolving apparently conflicting portions of the Act are problematic, not only for the inherent contradictions, but
also because it undercuts the intent of the National Wildlife Refuge System itself.'33
Moreover, the implications of this interpretation of the NWRSIA could be surprising
and undesirable. Even so, there are extra-judicial remedies
that may be employed
134
to remedy any results that Congress did not intend.
The court concluded that the state was preempted from vaccinating elk on the
NER largely because of its interpretation of the NWRSIA's "mission.""'35 Focusing
on the court's parallel conclusion that the only way to achieve this purpose would
be for the Act to exclude any exercise of authority by the states unless the agency
communicates otherwise,' 36 the court found that the Act must have been intended
to preempt state authority.'37 This conclusion is inherently vulnerable in light of the
fact that the Act also states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting
the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control,
or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area
within the System.' ' 138 It does not necessarily follow that one of the provisions must
be completely ignored in an effort to resolve apparently contradictory provisions;
especially here, where the goal of the state action is the improvement of the health
and safety of wildlife inside the refuge, as well as outside.
The court's interpretation in Wyoming is a prime example of form over substance. 139 Even if the court's conclusion is correct, adherence to the decision is
contrary to the goal of the Act: providing refuge for wildlife. Specifically, by
allowing the USFWS to negligently and injuriously manage the NER'" because the

131. See generally Hunt, 278 U.S. 96; Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Geer, 161 U.S. 519, overruled on other
grounds by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391.
132. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218, 1227-28.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000) ("the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of
the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and future

generations of Americans").
134. See infra Part V.B.
135. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1228, 1233-34.
136. Id. at 1234.
137. Id.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
139. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (holding that the

Establishment Clause does not act as an absolute bar to placing a public employee in a "sectarian" school because
it would "exalt form over substance").
140. Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999), aff d in part and rev'd in
part, 279 F.3d 1214 (2002) (The court characterized the agency's actions as "playing out a stalling game."); Parker
Land & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 486 (The court characterized the agency's management of the NER as
"negligent" and "unreasonable.").
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NWRSIA allows them to preempt state action, 4 ' the elk are exposed to an increased
risk of disease and subsequent sterility, lameness, or death. Since the main purpose
of the NER is to provide a healthy environment for elk, 142 the primary purpose of
the NER becomes secondary under the Wyoming decision.
Since states are the primary managers of wildlife, 43 it only seems logical that
states should have the authority to manage terrestrial game animals so that their
populations are healthy, outbreaks of disease are prevented, 44 and wildlife is
managed in such a way as to protect animal populations. This is especially true in
instances on federal land where the federal government has failed to manage wildlife
in order to achieve these goals. 145 In essence, the problem in Wyoming can be easily
characterized as one of disease and health management, not simply as an issue of
land or wildlife management. As such, it becomes absurd to conclude that a
relatively small parcel of land can be permitted to exempt itself46from a disease
prevention program and expect that the program will be effective. 1
Another possible unintended implication under the Wyoming decision is that any
state wildlife management action can be precluded from taking place on national
wildlife refuges if the USFWS decides that it should not occur. 1 47 Thus, state action
that is beneficial to wildlife, as was the case in Wyoming, can be proscribed under
the NWRSIA. As stated before, this is contrary to the purpose of the National
Wildlife Refuge System itself and leads to the possibility of absurd results. 48 For
example, if a highway traverses a national wildlife refuge, the federal government
has the authority to exclude the patrol of state veterinary emergency response teams.
This situation is oxymoronic because the purpose of the emergency response team
would be to assist animals and animal populations in mortal danger. State action,

141. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
143. See supra note 113.
144. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) ("Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of
every description... .No direct general power over these objects has been granted to Congress.").
145. See Parker Land & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 484; Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
146. The threat of smaller, isolated areas that inadequately control and remedy the spread of infectious
diseases has been justification to allow an authority responsible for the whole population to step in and manage the
area for the good of the larger population at risk. This is exemplified in the Public Health Service, Department of
Health, and Human Services Regulations, titled "Measure in the Event of Inadequate Local Control,"which pertain
to much more mobile human populations. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2002)
Whenever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determines that the
measures taken by health authorities of any State or possession (including political subdivisions
thereof) are insufficient to prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such
State orpossession to any other State or possession, he/she may take such measures to prevent
such spread of the diseases as he/she deems reasonably necessary, including inspection,
fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of animals or articles
believed to be sources of infection.
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there is a wildlife population consisting of organisms that enter and exit a national
wildlife refuge (the logical result is entrance into areas for which state authorities are responsible) as they will.
National management of wildlife populations modeled after 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2002) is not reasonable because
terrestrial wildlife is not nearly as mobile as human populations that can travel by plane, train, and automobile, and
because of additional problems associated with application. In the Wyoming case, the state would be the larger
authority when compared with the NER for purposes of the health and disease control analysis. This is inherently
obvious due to the fact that the NER is enclosed within the state.
147. See, e.g., Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214.
148. Id.
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such as implementing veterinary emergency response teams, would be especially
valuable and effective in situations where the federal government did not provide
similar services to save or protect these animals. Further confounding the intent of
legislation like the NWRSIA, the only reason the state is precluded from assisting
these animals is that they happen to be injured while passing through federal
property. Precluding the state from performing these actions is an absurd result; a
result that is not persuasive in light of the fundamental goals of legislation that
attempts to bring about increased numbers and the improved health of organisms for
which wildlife refuges are established.
Essentially, Wyoming muddles the goal of the NWRSIA. The goal of this legislation was not to have the federal government regulate and care for various parcels of
land, as the court contends, but to manage these parcels of land for a particular
149
purpose: to create areas for wildlife to find refuge. The only reason authority to
manage these lands was consolidated within the federal government was "for the
conservation of fish and wildlife, including species that are threatened with
extinction." 50
The court in Wyoming based its finding of preemption largely on the implication
'
that the mission of the Act was "to administer a national network of lands.""' This
is especially awkward because this phrase is taken entirely out of context. The entire
provision reads, "The mission of the System is to administer a national network of
lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restorationof the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within52the
United States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans."'
From the language of the Act, it is obvious that the administration of a "national
network of lands and waters" is only a method of achieving the primary goal of the
NWRSIA, "the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the
fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats....""' Since this is Congress's
primary goal in enacting the NWRSIA, the Wyoming court appears to have based
its finding of preemption on an incorrect interpretation of the Act's purpose.
Oddly enough, the incorrect basis for the court's finding of preemption allowed
preclusion of state action that undertakes to promote the purpose of the NWRSIA
by improving the refuge environment for wildlife. It seems axiomatic that actions
promoting the purpose of the NWRSIA should be undertaken, and those that are
contrary prohibited. If so, Congress would have intended the federal government to
adopt or permit enforcement of state laws and policies that afford better "refuge" for
wildlife, not to forego improvements merely because a state happened to be the
entity proactively undertaking such action. The paramount purpose of the NWRSIA
is not simply to ensure exclusive federal management over national refuge lands, but
149. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1) (2000) ("For the purpose of consolidating the authorities relating to the various
categories of areas that are administered by the Secretary for the conservation of fish and wildlife, including species
that are threatened with extinction, all lands, waters, and interests therein administered by the Secretary as wildlife
refuges, areas for the protection and conservation of fish and wildlife that are threatened with extinction, wildlife
ranges, game ranges, wildlife management areas, or waterfowl production areas.....
150. Id.
151. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
152. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
153. Id.
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involves managing the overall environment and health of animal populations on
these lands. The court's holding omits consideration of this possibility.
On another front, perhaps Congress could adopt an amendment to the NWRSIA
that would allow states to intervene in instances such as the one faced in Wyoming.
Multiple courts found the management of the NER to be much less than satisfactory. 4 Courts should not be required to openly reprimand federal agencies and, at
the same time, have no remedies available to rectify situations where federal
agencies are "unable or unwilling" to do anything. 55
C. Review under the APA
The court's analysis of the state's APA claim is sound in form, but, in finding that
judicial review was not precluded, it relied upon statements and implications it
disregarded under the preemption analysis to hold the NWRSIA "undoubtedly
places limits on the agency's discretion."' 56 The Tenth Circuit then ruled that the
APA claim had been improperly dismissed, and the court ultimately relied upon the
Act's requirements to coordinate, interact, and cooperate with state wildlife
agencies"5 7 to find legislative intent to limit the authority granted to the agency and
allow judicial review.'5 8 Thus, it is ironic that the court relied upon the Act's protection of state authority to find limitation that justifies judicial review,1 59 while at
the same time disregarding these constraints' 60 under the preemption analysis. 6 '
Disregarding and applying the same provisions in various contexts injects
unpredictability into the interpretation of the NWRSIA. In other words, confusion
is created when one tries to determine which provisions will be regarded and
disregarded in varying contexts.
Such interpretation allows for some portions of the Act to be disregarded, while
other portions may be interpreted in ways that do not reflect the text of the legislation. Specifically, by interpreting provisions that require the agency to coordinate,
interact, and cooperate with states1 62 to allow judicial review, 163 and at the same time
disregarding an entire provision of the Act"6 to find implied preemption,1 65 there is
unpredictability in the interpretation and application of the NWRSIA. Courts should
attempt to reconcile differences in interpretations before concluding with one that
disregards significant portions of a piece of legislation such that only a portion of

154. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239; Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (2002); ParkerLand & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 484.
155. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1240.
156. Id. at 1237.
157. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(e) (2000).
158. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1234.
161. While courts may approach certain questions differently and the standards of review may not be the same
(between determining whether judicial review of agency decisions is permitted within an Act and whether
preemption is intended under the same Act), practically speaking, when the very same provisions are disregarded
in one context and held inviolable in another, an atmosphere of uncertainty is created.
162. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(E) (2000).
163. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
164. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
165. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
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167
a sentence is used to determine its goal.' 66 Section 668dd(m) of the NWRSIA
especially in
should be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to its language,
68
668dd(a)(4)(e).
subsection
to
effect
light of giving substantial
In this case, section 668dd(m) does not need to be disregarded. This section can
be interpreted to allow states to act in the best interest of the wildlife for which a
federal wildlife refuge has been established. At the same time, the Act can give
effect to the federal administration of lands requirement through imposition of
minimum management requirements.
Under the proposed and aforementioned interpretation, the traditional status of
states as wildlife managers would be upheld, and the states could manage populations of wildlife on national wildlife refuges to ensure their continued health and
existence through consistent wildlife management. Under this scenario, states would
be free to engage in more stringent management standards than required under the
NWRSIA. This would both ensure that the federal government can "administer a
national network of lands"'169 and that it can provide "for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources
and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and future
generations of Americans."'"7 Since the latter goal may be achieved by more assertive undertakings, states would logically be welcome to do so under the spirit and
language of the NWRSIA. This interpretation would also give force and recognition
to the Act where it states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting
the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control,
or regulate fish and17 resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area
within the System."' 1

D. Problems Presentedby Wyoming to Wildlife Management under the Tenth
Amendment and State Sovereignty
States have historically been, and continue to be, the entities with primary
responsibility of managing wildlife.'7 2 The few exceptions have arisen mainly out
of treaties and out of both the Property and Supremacy Clauses. 173 Nonetheless,

166. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) ("[I]n expounding a statute, we [are] not...guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy."' (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987))).
167. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
State Authority: Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction,
or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife
under State law or regulations in any area within the System. Regulations permitting hunting or
fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the extent practicable,
consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and management plans.
Id.
168. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(E) (2000) ("In administering the System, the Secretary shall--ensure effective
coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of land adjoining refuges and the fish and wildlife agency
of the States in which the units of the System are located.").
169. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000)).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000) (emphasis added).
172. 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2002); Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166; Geer, 161 U.S. 519, overruled on other grounds
by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391; Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.
173. 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2002).
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there is sound justification for state dominance in this arena. If disease spreads
through Wyoming's elk and cattle herds, the citizens of Wyoming are likely to hold
state officials accountable for any negligent management. 7" After all, "where the
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will
bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision."' 7' The Supreme Court of the United States has extended the "accountability doctrine" to preclude the federal government from directing state "officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program."'' 7 6 It reasonably follows that the federal government would not be able to
preclude "the meaningful accomplishment of [a state's] responsibilities" to its
citizens. 77 In both circumstances the federal government is directing state
government to act (or refrain from acting) such that any negative impacts are likely
to be attributed to state officers.
If Congress truly intended to preempt state action that prevents the spread of
disease through wild game and domesticated animals, then, at the very least, it
should make a clear statement to that effect. 78 Since animals are not considered a
part of the land due to their ability to come and go and because the federal government does not own wildlife, 79 it is difficult to rationalize the ability of Congress to
preempt state authority on the basis of the Property Clause alone. Federal ownership
of a certain parcel of land within a state does not necessarily equate to the federal
government having exclusive control over wildlife that just happens to be on that
piece of property at a particular point in time.' 80 Eventually, these animals leave
federal lands and may spread disease, causing the federal government's negligence
to be instrumental in expanding the scope and damage of outbreak.' 8 ' The results
could leave the state's fish and wildlife agency to explain why hunters fill their bag
limits at the lowest rates they have experienced; or the state may be left to explain
to conservation organizations why their members are no longer able to view and
photograph healthy wildlife; or the state's agricultural department could be left to
explain why all of the dairies in the state are closed, cattle are being slaughtered to
stem the spread of disease, and prices for cheese, milk, steak, and hamburger have
risen to the highest levels ever experienced.
States also have an inherent responsibility to protect the health and welfare of
their citizens. 8 2 A state must have some recourse rapidly available when a federal
agency endangers the public health and safety of citizens in a particular state or
group of states. For instance, suppose the federal government was experimenting
with bats on federal land by attaching incendiary devices to the hapless creatures,

174. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
175. Id. at 169.
176. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
177. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1241.
178. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; TRIBE,
supra note 25, § 6-3 1.
179. See supra note 111.
180. Id.
181. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1219.
182. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 205; see also Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1241.
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such that when they were motionless for a certain period of time the device would
detonate. 8 3 Now suppose the federal government's new comrades in arms regularly
left the federal lands while foraging or to migrate, resulting in the destruction and
endangerment of people and property outside of federal lands. The state should not
be required to stand by helpless to protect its citizens because the Property Clause
allows the federal government to do as it pleases on federal lands, "regardless of the
circumstances" and regardless of the effects outside of the federal land. As the
Supreme Court has stated,
[the] immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the [federal] government: all which can
be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws,
quarantinelaws, health laws of every description...arecomponent parts of this
mass. No direct generalpower over these objects is granted to Congress; and,

consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the legislative power
of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where
the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to
some power which is expressly given.'
In Wyoming, the problem begins with a local elk population that travels in and out
of federal lands. 8 5 The state manages the elk population in and out of federal land
through the promulgation of hunting regulations and additional programs to monitor
and maintain the health of the herd. 8 6 The USFWS makes the decision not to adopt
prudent methods to stem the spread of a disease affecting ungulates on the NER
87
because they happen to be on this federal land at a certain point in time. In this
instance, it is difficult to discern the overriding national purpose in preempting state
management of local elk populations. Furthermore, there is no power that is clearly
incidental to the preemption of state management over terrestrial game animals not
in danger of extinction. 88 In fact, the district court has repeatedly found the federal

183. A Batty Idea for Firebombing Tokyo, in WILLIAM B. BREUER, TOP SECRET TALES OF WORLD WAR iat
123 (2000) (The actual experimentation and use of napalm incendiary devices on bats resulted in the escape of some
bats and accidental destruction of U.S. buildings.).
184. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203--04 (emphasis added).
185. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1219.
186. Id. at 1220; Wyoming Game and Fish Dep't, 2002 Deer Hunting Season, available at http://gf.state.wy
.us/adminlregulations/chapter6/ch6deer.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2003) (defining hunting seasons and bag limits
for federal and non-federal lands).
187. Wyoming, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23, affid in part and rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cit. 2002);
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
188. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203-04. A finding of preemption is especially problematic in this case, where
the statute is, at best, unclear about congressional intent to preempt state management through the Property Clause.
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1240 ("If the executive and legislative branches of our Government will not act to resolve
the brucellosis controversy in the State of Wyoming in what little time remains, the judicial branch may have to.");
id. at 1233 ("The main legislative theory seems to be on the order of 'let's just muddle through as best we can and
let the courts handle the hard cases."') (quoting George Cameron Coggins & Michael E. Ward, The Law of Wildlife
Management on FederalPublic Lands, 60 OR. L REv. 59, 84-85 (1981)); Wyoming, 61 F. Supp.2d at 1223 ("this
patchwork of federal law").
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actions at the NER to be counterproductive to elk management. 89 Unfortunately,
this does not seem to be an isolated incident of federal agencies apparently
contradicting legislation, and themselves, to the detriment of the species involved."9
The federal government has in the past been required to demonstrate injury or the
possibility of injury by wildlife in order to violate state law pertaining to wildlife
management on federal lands.91 The Eighth Circuit has recently held that the federal
government can regulate activity outside of federal property in order to reduce any
92
negative impacts on federal lands that emanate from outside of the federal lands. 1
Under this line of reasoning, when the federal government conducts, or fails to
regulate, activities that are equally detrimental to state lands and their purposes,' 9 3
it is reasonable to conclude that the state should also have the authority to regulate
the activities causing negative impacts.' 94
VI. CONCLUSION
It is troubling that the court chose to interpret the NWRSIA as preempting state
law that addresses areas that federal law does not, especially when the intent to
preempt is clearly questionable.'9 5 Perhaps it would be better if Congress specifically
and completely preempted state authority or decided to forfeit altogether wildlife
management authority gained by the federal government since the early twentieth
century. These are both all or nothing approaches for either the federal or state
governments to assume exclusive control, and since there appears to be a more
effective method of wildlife management in concurrent jurisdiction situations, those
options may not be the best available. For example, the NWRSIA framework can
be interpreted to provide minimum management requirements for state agencies,
reminiscent of other federal environmental legislation.' Under that interpretation,
189. Wyoming, 61 F. Supp.2d at 1222-23 (characterizing the agency's actions as "playing out a stalling
game"); ParkerLand& Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 486,488 (characterizing the agency's management of the NER
as "negligent" and "unreasonable").
190. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, The Best & Worst for Wildlife, available at http://nwf.org/
bestandworst/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). For example,
[t]he big cat's [Florida Panther] power, stealth and cunning are proving no match for the apathy
of the federal agencies mandated to protect it. Fewer than 100 Florida panthers remain in the
wild, yet throughout the past year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service consistently refused to
protect the very habitat it deemed essential to the recovery of the federally endangered cat. In
the past decade, the agency has approved the destruction of more than 6,000 acres of panther
habitat. Development plans for tens of thousands of additional acres appear to be headed for
similar rubber stamping, making way for golf courses, vacation homes and shopping centers...
edging out this sensitive creature.
Id.
191. See N.M. State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d at 1201; Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
192. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1999).
193. These activities may also affect federal lands just as negatively, and, since these lands are public, it is
logical that the state may also have a duty to ensure that these federal public lands within the state are not being
negatively impacted without justification.
194. Of course, such interpretation would not extend to activities that are minimally detrimental or activities
concerning legitimate national interests, such as national defense. Here we are limited to discussing the
environmental impacts on areas set aside for preservation of some sort. Examples of some activities that have been
found to have detrimental effects on such reservations are the use of off-road vehicles and watercraft in waterfowl
refuges. See Block, 660 F.2d 1240.
195. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218.
196. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2002).
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if particular states were unable or unwilling to implement the NWRSIA, then the
federal government would do so.
At least for the purpose of wildlife management on national wildlife refuges, it
appears the term "dual sovereignty" could be replaced with the term "dueling
sovereignties." No quarrel can be had with the Wyoming court's conclusion that
197
cooperation is integral in this field and, in this case, there was far too little, if any.
This is a case where the court gives great latitude and deference to the agency's
interpretation of the Act. If the agency's interpretation, preemption of all state
wildlife management on national wildlife refuges, is truly the situation intended by
Congress, then "dual sovereignty" in the context of wildlife management is not
present. This then creates additional tension with the NWRSIA's requirements that
stipulate federal compliance and consistency with state law, because state law in this
area would be null.
The Wyoming court states that "[i]f the executive and legislative branches of our
Government will not act to resolve the brucellosis controversy in the State of
Wyoming in what little time remains, the judicial branch may have to."' 98 However,
the entity acting most affirmatively to resolve this problem is clearly the state of
Wyoming. This is likely due to the state's constituents having a large stake in the
outcome of the brucellosis problem in Wyoming. Nevertheless, the court perceives
the legislation it reviewed to be unclear and contradictory but has decided to bind
itself tightly with the agency and its interpretation. All the while the court
acknowledges the agency's apparent shortcomings in wielding its awesome and
exclusive powers over wildlife management on national wildlife refuges.' 99 And, all
the while, "the poor, dumb creatures of the wild suffer as this disease spreads while
the [US]FWS dithers.....'2°°
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Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241.
Wyoming, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.

